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Many critiques of the Central Intelligence Agency’s alleged use of killer drones depend on law that does not
bind the United States or on contestable applications of uncertain facts to vague law. While acknowledging a
blurry line between law and policy, we continue to develop a due process for targeted killing. In the real world,
intelligence is sometimes faulty, mistakes occur, and peaceful civilians are at risk. International humanitarian
law, which applies during armed conflicts, demands very little in the way of process beyond the admonition to
take feasible precautions. Even so, the intelligence-driven nature of targeted killing, and the accompanying
concerns over mistakes and abuse, prompt the law – whether couched as IHL or something else – to develop
specifics for a CIA drone program. To assist this development, the United States should publicize and defend
its standards. If any of these standards turn out to be indefensible, the United States should abandon them and
develop better rules for its shadow war. The law and policy for CIA drones should evolve toward
accountability and transparency without blocking the sometimes necessary assertion of American force
around the world.
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The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA
Targeted Killing
Afsheen John Radsan* and Richard Murphy**
INTRODUCTION
Just suppose. The Attorney General, lanky as the President, walks into
the Oval Office to join a meeting. The top law enforcement officer is
slumped down with apparent bad news. He avoids eye contact with the
Commander-in-Chief. “Mr. President,” he says looking down at the coffee
table, “the ACLU believes our drone program is illegal.” Silence. (The
President and the Attorney General both, of course, maintain links to the
human rights community, an important part of their political base.) The
President’s other advisers fidget and twitch. The Vice President adjusts the
coaster under his drink. Beads of perspiration form on some faces. The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense look for the exit; the law is
not their thing.
The President is cool. “Could you be more specific,” he says, tapping
his finger on a black briefing book.
The Attorney General looks up from the table. “The drone strikes in
Pakistan. Remember, the program Leon was not supposed to talk about
1
with the media.”
The President smiles. “Yes, I know that. But which laws are they
talking about?”
After an awkward pause, the President, himself a highly sophisticated
lawyer, suggests, “Let’s talk this through some more.” The Attorney
General agrees. After the lawyer-to-lawyer exchange, the other advisers
relax. Maybe the CIA drone strikes are not illegal after all. Or maybe the
apparent illegality does not matter that much. The Vice President takes a
sip of his drink. And the President asks for tea and coffee to be served. No

* Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Assistant General Counsel at the
Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 to 2004. The authors do not rely on Radsan’s CIA
experience for any factual assertions in this essay. Many thanks to Benjamin Canine,
Benjamen Linden, and Christopher Proczko for their assistance on this article.
** AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.
1. U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan Called “Very Effective,” CNN (May 10, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/ (quoting Leon Panetta as
saying the Predator is “the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the
al Qaeda leadership”).
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one wants to leave the room after all. They open their briefing books
instead.
This scenario emphasizes a simple point: President Obama, a Harvard
Law School graduate, a former teacher of constitutional law at the
University of Chicago and a Nobel Peace Laureate, must believe that he has
the authority to order the CIA to fire missiles from drones to kill suspected
terrorists. Not everyone agrees with him, though.
For almost a decade now, the United States has been firing missiles
from unmanned drones to kill people identified as leaders of al Qaeda and
the Taliban. This “targeted killing” has engendered controversy in
policymaking and legal circles, spilling into law review articles, op-ed
2
pieces, congressional hearings, and television programs. On one level, this
2. For a significant judicial assessment of the legality of targeted killing, see Pub.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, HCJ 769/02, (Dec. 11, 2005), available
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/ 007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf [hereinafter PC
ATI] (Israeli High Court decision subjecting targeted killing in armed conflict to various
procedural and substantive controls suggested by human rights law). For a congressional
hearing focusing on the use of drones for targeted killing, see The Rise of the Drones II –
Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec.
and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 2d Sess.
(2010) (including testimony from Professors Mary Ellen O’Connell, William C. Banks,
David Glazier, and Kenneth Anderson). For other commentary, see NILS MELZER, TARGETED
KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 442-444 (2008) (providing a detailed survey and
assessment of targeted killing under international humanitarian law, international human
rights law, and the law governing interstate use of force); Philip Alston, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Study
on Targeted Killings, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/ 14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (assessing the legality
of targeted killing generally, criticizing, in particular, elements of the United States’ CIA
drone campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban); Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA
FOR REFORM 346 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (focusing on self-defense as a rationale for
targeted killing of terrorists); William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing
and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 749 (2003)
(concluding that U.S. law treats targeted killing as a “as a permissible but tightly managed
and fully accountable weapon of national self-defense”); Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann,
Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT. SEC. J. 145 (2010) (discussing difficulties
of pigeonholing targeted killing of terrorists into the traditional models of armed conflict or
law enforcement and suggesting limits on targeted killing should ultimately be “respectful of
the values and considerations espoused” by both models); Robert Chesney, Who May Be
Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal
Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. (2010) (assessing the legality of the United States targeting
Anwar al-Awlaki, a dual Yemeni-American citizen, under the U.N. Charter, IHL, and IHRL
regimes); W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 711, 724 (2007) (predicting evolution of a legal norm permitting targeted
killing in some circumstances); Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 319, 334 (2004) (concluding “targeted killing is a legitimate and
effective form of active self-defense”); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected
Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
171 (2005) (contending that IHL should borrow elements of IHRL to provide greater
protection against improper targeting of suspected terrorists); Richard Murphy & Afsheen
John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405
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controversy is curious. A state has considerable authority in war to kill
enemy combatants – whether by gun, bomb, or cruise missile – so long as
those attacks obey basic, often vague, rules (e.g., avoidance of
“disproportionate” collateral damage). So what is so different about
targeted killing by drone?
Some of the concerns about a CIA drone campaign relate to the
personalized nature of targeted killing. All attacks in an armed conflict
must, as a matter of basic law and common sense, be targeted. To attack
something, whether by shooting a gun at a person or dropping a bomb on a
building, is to target it. “Targeted killing,” however, refers to a
premeditated attack on a specific person. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
for instance, ordered Admiral Yamamoto killed not because he was any
Japanese sailor, but because he was the author of “tora, tora, tora” on Pearl
Harbor. President Obama, more recently, ordered Osama bin Laden killed
not because the Saudi was any member of al Qaeda, but because he was the
author of 9/11 who continued to command the terrorist organization.
Targeted killing is psychologically disturbing because it is individualized.
It is easier for a U.S. operator to kill a faceless soldier in a uniform than
someone whom the operator has been tracking with photographs, videos,
voice samples, and biographical information in an intelligence file.
There is also concern that drones will attack improperly identified
targets or cause excessive collateral damage. Targets who hide among
peaceful civilians heighten these dangers. Of course, drone strikes should
be far more precise than bombs dropped from a piloted aircraft. The lower
(2009) (contending that CIA drone strikes against non-citizens located outside the United
States implicate due process under the U.S. Constitution) [hereinafter Due Process and
Targeted Killing]; Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border
Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, 85 NAV. WAR COLL. INT’L L. STUDIES 109
(2009) (assessing the legality of U.S. incursions into Pakistan to attack al Qaeda and the
Taliban); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of
U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010) (concluding that a
state may, as a matter of self-defense, legally target non-state actors directly involved in
armed attacks); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 343 (2010) (concluding that the United States is not in an armed
conflict with al Qaeda and that “[p]eacetime criminal law, not the law of armed conflict is
the right choice against sporadic acts of terrorist violence”); Mary Ellen O’Connell,
Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING
TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming)
(concluding that CIA drone attacks in Pakistan are illegal) [hereinafter Case Study]; Afsheen
John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA
Targeted Killing, 2011 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 101 (2011) (proposing that IHL principles require
the CIA to be certain of its targets beyond reasonable doubt and that CIA drone strikes
should receive independent review) [hereinafter Measure Twice]; Gary Solis, Targeted
Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict, 60 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 127, 134-136 (2007)
(concluding that targeted strikes against civilians are legal only if: (a) the civilian is directly
participating in hostilities, and (b) the attack was authorized by a senior military
commander).
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“costs” of drone strikes, however, encourage governments to resort to
deadly force more quickly – a trend that may accelerate as drone
technology rapidly improves and perhaps becomes fully automated through
advances in artificial intelligence. Paradoxically, improved precision could
lead to an increase in deadly mistakes.
Another concern relates to granting an intelligence agency trigger
authority. Entrusting drones to the CIA, an intelligence agency with a
checkered history as to the use of force whose activities are largely
conducted in secret, heightens concerns in some quarters that strikes may
sometimes kill the wrong people for the wrong reasons. If applied sloppily
or maliciously, targeted killing by drones could amount to nothing more
than advanced death squads.
For these and related reasons, the use of killer drones merits serious
thought and criticism. Along these lines, many opponents of the reported
CIA program have decried it as illegal. Without questioning their sincerity,
one can acknowledge the soundness of their tactics. “Law talk” offers them
a strong weapon. How could anyone, without shame or worse, support an
illegal killing campaign? Illegality is for gangsters, drug dealers, and other
outlaws – not the Oval Office.
A thorough review of the arguments against the CIA drone campaign,
however, shows that most critics invoke laws that do not bind American
officials or laws that are vague. In a zone of ambiguity, one expects those
responsible for protecting the United States to interpret their authority
broadly. The President and his advisers – notably Harold Koh, the Dean of
Yale Law School, currently the State Department Legal Adviser and a
human rights specialist of the first order – have argued and concluded that
3
CIA drone strikes are legal. The rules of armed conflict and the laws of
interstate force permit the United States reasonably to assert the right to use
the CIA to fire missiles from unmanned drones to kill “fighting” members
of al Qaeda and the Taliban located in countries that are unable (or perhaps
unwilling) to control the threat these armed groups pose.
Although critics of the CIA drone program do not demonstrate that its
strikes are clearly illegal, some raise important points on how the law,
drifting into policy, should constrain drone strikes. As noted, the CIA
drone campaign and any similar campaigns pose acute dangers of mistakes
and abuses. The law, in response to this type of problem, seeks to ensure
accuracy, fairness, and accountability by insisting on regular, responsible
procedures. Yet the laws of war, generally speaking, merely require
4
reasonable precautions before striking. A simple rule-of-reason seems

3. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Internat’l Law (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gove/s/1/releases/ remarks/139119.htm.
4. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Art. 57,
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inadequate for targeted killing that, by its terms, demands “intelligence5
driven use of force.”
To facilitate the evolution of a “due process” of targeted killing, in two
earlier pieces, we have attempted to tease controls from the U.S.
Constitution and from international humanitarian law’s insistence on
6
reasonable precautions.
Whether for us or for other commentators,
creating fine-grained constraints will not be straightforward. If the
constraints are to evolve at all, they are likely to come from a long dialogue
among many interested parties. The United States could add to this
conversation by publicly adopting standards for its use of drones that ensure
accuracy and accountability. The CIA, accordingly, could acknowledge a
general role in the drone program without mentioning the names of any
participating countries. By giving up a thin veil of secrecy, the CIA would
benefit from more informed public scrutiny and might receive more support
from some American citizens and allies. But that increased transparency
could carry costs, including offending those concerned about the level of
collateral damage. Residents of foreign countries closest to the locations of
CIA strikes are likely to be the most sensitive. Take Pakistan as one
possible example.
We do not expect opponents of CIA drones to give up their rhetorical
weapon claiming illegality. Their rhetoric, however, tends to obscure how
the law should evolve to result in good policy. The relevant substantive law
governing resort to deadly force by states is and necessarily will remain
vague. In contrast, the specific procedures for CIA targeted killing cry out
for scrutiny and improvement. At the level of specificity that matters to
actual drone operators, good law blurs into good policy. At this level, all of
the President’s national security team, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, are
welcome to advise him on drones.
To help further this conversation, this essay explores legal concerns
raised by targeted killing in the context of the CIA drone campaign. Part I
briefly assesses the significance of domestic law regimes. In short, U.S.
law plainly authorizes some sort of drone campaign; the domestic laws of
other countries do not bind American officials or alter their legal duties.
Analysis must therefore focus on the drone campaign’s compliance with
international law. Part II concludes that the drone campaign appears to
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also MELZER, supra note 2, at 364 (observing that the
requirement of feasible precaution has attained customary status in both international and
non-international armed conflicts).
5. Kenneth Anderson, “Efficiency” Jus in Bello and “Efficiency” Jus Ad Bellum in
the Practice of Targeted Killing Through Drone Warfare?, PENN CONF. ON TARGETED
KILLING, WORKING PAPER SSRN SERIES 2 (Apr. 18, 2011 Draft), available at
http://www.ssrn-id1812124.pdf.
6. See generally, Murphy & Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing, supra note
2; Radsan & Murphy, Measure Twice, supra note 2.
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comply with applicable substantive norms of international law. Part III
addresses the adequacy of procedural limits on CIA drone strikes and offers
tentative recommendations for improvement.
I. CIA DRONE STRIKES AND DOMESTIC LAW
A. The President at Maximum Authority Under U.S. Domestic Law
In assessing the legality of CIA drone strikes, one should remember that
the President is acting with maximum constitutional authority when
engaged in armed conflict against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Within a week of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of
7
Military Force (AUMF). This congressional boost authorizes the President
to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against those who “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks or “harbored” the
8
attackers. In terms of Justice Robert H. Jackson’s famous framework from
the Steel Seizure Case, the AUMF put the President in his most
constitutionally powerful position for prosecuting a war against al Qaeda
and the Taliban. In that position, the President “personif[ies] the federal
9
sovereignty.”
The President’s authority to use force is not limited to the terms of the
AUMF. Article II of the U.S. Constitution arguably grants him, as
Commander-in-Chief, as representative of the United States in foreign
policy, and through a separate vesting of executive power, independent
levers for the use of force. Witness the use of American force in Libya to
protect rebels from being attacked by their own government. President
Obama justified this Libyan action by a combination of his executive
10
powers plus an applicable U.N. Security Council Resolution.
The
11
President has the power (and the duty) to repel attacks on the nation.
Still, the AUMF is not a blank check for unlimited war-making. It
authorizes force only against persons and entities bearing responsibility for
the 9/11 attacks. Because al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated groups are
amorphous in themselves and in their interrelationships, it may take

7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §1541 (2006)).
8. Id.
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
10. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya
(Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/
remarks-president-situation-libya; see also S.C. Res. 1973, ¶4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar.
17, 2011), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8119533.html (authorizing Member
States “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under threat of attack” in Libya).
11. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 647, 659–660 (1863).
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contestable judgments based on classified information to resolve whether a
particular entity (e.g., al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) is part of al
Qaeda, a close ally, or a loose affiliate. For this reason, Jack Goldsmith and
others have suggested that the AUMF be updated to include international
terrorist groups that threaten American security but are distinct from al
12
Qaeda. This problem of characterization, however, cannot preclude the
legality of the CIA drone campaign per se since core members of al Qaeda
and the Taliban – many of whom reside in Pakistan – plainly fall within the
AUMF’s ambit.
Determining targeting authority under the AUMF, in sum, requires an
assessment of whether a person is a member of an entity that “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks or “harbored” them.
Applying this broad language involves an exercise in discretion. We expect
that the President, in conducting this exercise, will weigh national security
more highly than the ACLU does. The President takes into account his
special responsibilities under the Constitution.
B. The Legal Irrelevance of Other Nations’ Domestic Law
Critics of the CIA’s targeted killing program contend that drone strikes
13
might constitute crimes in the countries in which they occur. Violations of
a foreign nation’s laws can indeed create difficulties for American officials.
Italian authorities, for instance, have issued arrest warrants against CIA
14
officials in connection with an extraordinary rendition from that country.
So those American officials must now be careful where they travel. But as
long as the President and his agents do not fall into the jurisdictional grasp
of a nation in which drone strikes occur, that nation’s laws lack force for
U.S. operators. Those domestic laws cannot trump U.S. law, which charges
the President with protecting the United States. Where the President’s
constitutional obligation to protect the United States so requires, the
President must violate another nation’s law. The President and his advisers
should consider, of course, the policy implications of domestic violations in
other countries – and the charge of murder is, needless to say, especially
sensitive. Assessing such considerations, the President is making a policy
judgment, not a legal judgment, about the force of another country’s laws.

12. Jack Goldsmith, More on the Growing Problem of Extra-AUMF Threats,
LAWFARE (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/more-on-the-growingproblem-of-extra-aumf-threats.
13. See, e.g., O’Connell, Case Study, supra note 2, at 22 (noting that CIA officers are
not lawful combatants and could be charged with crimes under Pakistani law).
14. Stephen Grey & Don Van Natta, Jr., 13 with the C.I.A. Sought by Italy in a
Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A1.
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The most obvious example of how these concerns should play out is the
killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. The United States, after careful
surveillance and planning, organized a helicopter attack on bin Laden’s
compound in an area under civilian Pakistani control. According to public
accounts, the United States did not notify Pakistan of the raid in advance.
For the sake of argument, stipulate that killing bin Laden was murder under
Pakistani law. Nonetheless, given an adequate assurance of success and
limited collateral damage, any American President would have ordered the
bin Laden attack, and any account of the President’s obligations that says
otherwise should be discounted as unrealistic.
Independent of the bin Laden example, the CIA has a long reach around
the world. Like its sister agencies in the intelligence community, the CIA
habitually violates the laws of other countries – and arguably international
15
law as well – as it conducts espionage around the world. Every year since
the CIA’s founding in 1947, Congress has appropriated money for the
16
Agency to conduct espionage and other secret activities. To steal secrets
from other countries, the CIA is expected – by Congress and by anyone else
who thinks for more than a moment – to violate other nations’ laws. After
all, it does not require a clandestine agency to collect the open-source
information available in newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and
television shows. The State Department could handle those matters on its
own.
II. CIA DRONE STRIKES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Most of the charges leveled against the CIA drone campaign turn on the
interpretation and application of international law in the form of either
treaties or custom. One should recall that international law binds American
officials only if it is also U.S. law. This fact leads to the problem of
determining just which international laws convert into U.S. law. Some
cases are easy: A treaty approved by the Senate constitutes a type of U.S.
law, although making it domestically enforceable may require additional
17
legislation.
Some cases are hard: determining the binding force of
18
customary international law, for example. Moreover, even if some piece

15. A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 596 (2007).
16. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, §102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495, 498
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §403-3(d)(5) (2006)) (“[I]t shall be the duty of the
Agency . . . to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”).
17. Medillin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-505 (2008).
18. For a nuanced discussion of the debate over the domestic force of customary
international law, see generally Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L LAW 365 (2002). For a forceful argument that customary
international law is not binding on the United States as a matter of constitutional law, see
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of international law has become U.S. law, there is always the possibility
that the United States, as a sovereign power, might change it – e.g., by
withdrawing from the treaty. Coupling this point with an aggressive
understanding of the President’s foreign affairs and commander-in-chief
powers, Michael Paulsen says that the President may freely abandon or
suspend the United States’ international law obligations, even many
19
enshrined in domestic law. Professor Paulsen offers an admonition that
the force of law on a sovereign is on some level always up to the sovereign
and is fraught with policy considerations. The Obama administration,
however, is not bogged down in academic debates; the Administration
states that the United States should (and indeed does) follow all relevant
20
international law.
Both proponents and opponents of the CIA drone
campaign thus largely agree on the framework of the discussion.
Part of the reason they can agree is that many norms of international
law are vague and even border on the vacuous. International humanitarian
law (IHL), for instance, forbids attacks that cause “disproportionate” or
“excessive” collateral damage to peaceful civilian interests. No responsible
party is likely to defend its attacks by claiming a right to cause “excessive”
collateral damage. No, that party will contend that its attacks honor
proportionality – though critics will claim the contrary. The norms of
international law, no doubt, leave room for major disagreements about
interpretation and application. This wiggle room helps ensure international
law’s existence by reducing incentives for nations to withdraw from a
regime they might otherwise regard as too restrictive. But it also limits the
power of international law to compel agreement from all interested parties
on whether an attack was legal, particularly in light of uncertain facts and a
lack of neutral observers. Unanimity over the legality of the CIA drone
campaign is thus highly unlikely. This said, as detailed below, international
law leaves ample room for the Obama administration to defend the
campaign’s legality.
A. It Is Reasonable To Conclude that IHL’s Paradigm for Killing Governs
Some Set of CIA Drone Strikes
Much of the debate about armed drones has revolved around whether it
is legal for a state to use extra-judicial means to kill a person who is not, at

Michael Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L. J.
1762, 1800-1804 (2009).
19. Paulsen, supra note 18, at 1842 (“The force of international law, as a body of law,
upon the United States is thus largely an illusion.”).
20. See Koh, supra note 3 (“[I]t is the considered view of this administration . . . that
targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”).
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that moment, an imminent threat. Again, though he was killed by a bullet
instead of a missile, bin Laden comes to mind: Did the United States have
an obligation to capture him alive in his compound if it could have done so
with minimal risk?
Whether deadly attacks are legal depends in large part on which
paradigm applies: international human rights law (IHRL), IHL, selfdefense, or some emergent hybrid. Rivers of ink have flowed on this
subject, but the bottom line is that IHL gives the United States authority to
use deadly force against some members of al Qaeda and the Taliban in
some places. The outer limits of this authority are – as one might expect –
hazy.
IHRL, which controls law enforcement, protects the right to life by
limiting state authority to kill by extrajudicial means to circumstances
where the target poses an immediate risk of death or serious injury to
21
others.
Drone strikes, however, attempt to kill people regardless of
whether they pose an immediate threat. Critics have therefore stressed that
these strikes contradict a fundamental tenet of IHRL. Philip Alston submits
that “[a]s a practical matter, there are very few situations outside the context
of active hostilities” that would satisfy IHRL’s requirement of imminent
22
threat. Promiscuous use of rhetorical devices such as the “ticking-time
bomb” to justify targeted killing “threatens to eviscerate the human rights
23
law prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life.” In short, “[i]f
one contests the view that an armed conflict is ongoing, the lawfulness of
24
any targeted killing is necessarily contested as well.”
IHLR does (and should) impose strict requirements on the use of deadly
force. There is a clear preference for capture and arrest. But, like all of the
law’s abstractions, IHRL is influenced by context. Thus Mary Ellen
O'Connell, a critic of the CIA drone campaign, seems to suggest that arrest
may not be necessary in areas so remote, violent, and lawless that an

21. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 2, at 59 (“It is generally found that, under human
rights law, targeted killings are permitted only in the most extreme circumstances, such as to
prevent a concrete and immediate danger of death or serious physical injury. . . .”). The right
to life (protected by limits on state authority to kill) is enshrined in Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides that “[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” The United States does not accept that the ICCPR
applies to actions it takes outside its borders. No administration would lay claim, however,
to a right to arbitrarily deprive others of life – wherever they may be. We will therefore
assume that IHRL’s basic protections of the right to life are binding, customary law. Cf.
Chesney, supra note 2, at 50 (making this same assumption).
22. Alston, supra note 2, ¶86.
23. Id.
24. Solis, supra note 2, at 135; see also Chris Downes, ‘Targeted Killings’ in an Age
of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 277, 294 (2004)
(contending that targeted killing “is irreconcilable with consistent support for many
fundamental human rights norms”).
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attempt would be futile. As a practical result, IHLR and IHL may come to
overlap more substantially – at least in "weak countries with poor human
26
rights records." O’Connell’s concession suggests that it is possible for the
human-rights and armed-conflict models to converge on the use of force
27
when dealing with the unique threat of international terrorism.
In comparison with IHRL, IHL allows states greater leeway to kill.
Proponents of the CIA’s drone campaign are therefore eager to characterize
the campaign as subject to IHL. IHL authorizes a state to target and kill
enemy combatants – provided they are not hors de combat by, for instance,
clearly surrendering. A soldier need not wait for an enemy combatant to
pull out a gun before shooting him; a pilot may drop bombs on opposition
forces asleep in their barracks; and, the President may order bin Laden
killed by a Navy SEAL team absent clear surrender.
For IHL to apply, an “armed conflict” must exist. Armed conflicts are
defined as international or non-international. As the American conflict with
the Taliban and al Qaeda is not among states, it is a non-international armed
conflict (NIAC). The law governing NIACs was originally developed to
28
control conflicts between states and internal dissident forces. Because
states have little interest in limiting their powers to deal with dissidents, it is
not surprising that the definition of NIAC is vague. Consider the following
definition, proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), which, it claims, reflects prevailing legal opinion:
Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed
confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and
the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such
groups . . . . The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level
25. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AMER. J. INT'L L. 446,
455 (2003) (condemning 2002 Predator strike in Yemen due to failure to demand surrender
but adding that a consensus might well develop that an unsuccessful Yemeni attack on al
Qaeda in the same area had demonstrated that "attempting to arrest anyone in the area would
be futile").
26. See id. (contending that, although the United States claimed the power to kill
terrorists anywhere without warning, it would be "highly unlikely" to wield this power
anywhere but in "weak countries with poor human rights records").
27. See also Chesney, supra note 2, at 56 (concluding that the United States, consistent
with IHRL, can kill al-Awlaki “so long as the U.S. government does indeed have substantial
reason to believe that he will continue to play an operational leadership role in planned
attacks against the United States and that he cannot plausibly be incapacitated with sublethal means.”); Blum & Heymann, supra note 2, at 160-164 (suggesting that targeted killing
of active participants in a terrorist scheme may be justified under a law-enforcement regime
even absent an immediate threat).
28. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The
Need To Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295,
308 (2007) (tracing the view that the category of non-international armed conflict was
limited to intra-state civil wars).
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of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a
29
minimum of organization.

Accordingly, drawing the line between riots and sporadic violence on the
one hand and a true NIAC on the other hand requires judgments subject to
30
reasonable disagreements.
Suppose, following bin Laden’s death, that the American conflict with
al Qaeda becomes sporadic and is no longer plausibly characterized as an
armed conflict. To address threats in the absence of armed conflict,
Kenneth Anderson contends that the United States may strike terrorists
based on a “self-defense” paradigm. In apparent opposition, Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter declares that Member States must “refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.” This language seems to
bar the use of force in self-defense. To avoid this absurdity, Article 51 adds
that nothing in the Charter shall “impair the inherent right of . . . selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”
As Anderson is quick to note, “self-defense is one of the most contested
31
issues in public international law.” Still, he observes that the United
States has long taken the view that it may resort to interstate force to
respond to a hostile act, to preempt imminent use of force, or to respond to
32
a continuing threat. Self-defense is not, of course, a license to unlimited
violence; it could not justify dropping a nuclear bomb on bin Laden’s
compound.
Rather, customary law insists on “necessity and
proportionality,” and, in applying these standards, decisionmakers should
33
regard IHL’s parallel standards as “highly persuasive.”
As Anderson surely expected, his argument for self-defense outside
armed conflict has elicited strong criticism. Critics have called his selfdefense justification, at least in its more aggressive form, “convoluted and
34
hard to sustain.” These critics emphasize the requirement of an imminent
threat. Alston, for example, describes the claim that states may strike
preemptively to block uncertain, non-imminent attacks as “deeply contested
35
and lack[ing] any basis in international law.” Alston further contends that

29. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), How Is the Term “Armed
Conflict’ Defined in International Humanitarian Law? 5 (2008), available at http://www.
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm.
30. For an argument that the conflict with al Qaeda does not amount to a “worldwidearmed conflict,” see O’Connell, The Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 15.
31. Anderson, supra note 2, at 18.
32. Id. at 18-19.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring
Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 77, 115 (2010).
35. Alston, supra note 2, ¶45; see also Hina Shamsi, Statement: The Rise of the
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Anderson’s views “reflect an unlawful and disturbing tendency” to permit
violations of international law and “impermissibly conflate jus ad bellum
36
Alston opposes anything that tends toward illegal
and jus ad bello.”
reprisals.
Over time, these debates about self-defense may play a role in defining
the abstract limits of state authority to engage in targeted killing. Applied
to CIA drone strikes, however, they currently border on the academic.
Under circumstances that include 9/11, American officials have reasonably
concluded that the American conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda is not
among states; it is a non-international armed conflict. This conclusion
allows the United States to target and kill some members of these armed
groups in some places under IHL’s relatively relaxed rules on killing.
B. The Law Does Not Limit CIA Strikes by Geographic “War Zones”
The existence of an armed conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda and the Taliban does not carry with it a license to kill enemy
combatants wherever they may be. There must be some limit on where the
CIA may strike; it would be beyond bizarre to argue, for example, that the
CIA could legally fire a missile at an al Qaeda operative in Toronto.
Two geographic limits have been suggested for drone strikes. The first
is premised on the idea that IHL, as a body of law to protect civilians, limits
the scope of armed conflicts. In a public letter to President Obama, the
ACLU argued that the AUMF implicitly limits his warmaking to “war
37
zone[s]” and “battlefields.” The ACLU states that “[t]he entire world is
not a war zone” and hints that even the border regions of Pakistan may not
38
qualify. Starting more directly from IHL’s law of NIAC, Alston contends
that it is difficult “for the US to show that – outside the context of the
armed conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq – it is in a transnational noninternational armed conflict against ‘al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
39
associated forces.’” These critics obviously reject the notion – integral to

Drones II – Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th
Cong. (2010), at 7, available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/index.php?option
=com_content&task=view&id=4903&Itemid=55.
36. Alston, supra note 2, ¶42.
37. Letter from Anthony D. Romero, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union,
to Barack Obama, President of the United States (Apr. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.aclu.org/human-rights-national-security/letter-president-obama-regarding-targetedkillings. See also Shamsi, supra note 35, at 4 (contending that the AUMF “does not contain broad
authorization for the use of lethal force anywhere in the world, in conflicts unrelated to the 9/11
attacks, or where there is no conflict at all.”).
38. Id.
39. Alston, supra note 2, ¶53.
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the Obama administration’s public justification for the drone program – that
40
the conflict with al Qaeda is global.
The ACLU’s insistence on an implicit restriction in the AUMF is
misplaced. If it were true that the conflict with al Qaeda is so easily
cabined, then it would seem to follow that the strike on bin Laden seventy
miles from Islamabad exceeded President Obama’s authority under the
AUMF. This conclusion amounts to a reductio ad absurdum. The AUMF
41
does not explicitly state any geographic limitation.
Alston’s argument is the more important as it purports to rest on basic
IHL principles instead of the AUMF. On closer inspection, however, his
argument is not really about geography. Instead, it is based on the premise
that persons or groups in countries allied with al Qaeda are unlikely to
42
qualify as organized armed groups that can be proper parties to NIAC.
Granted, figuring out which groups and people are integrated into al Qaeda
(and which are not) is a problem. That said, it is difficult to see why a
person outside of the “war zone” of Afghanistan could not be an al Qaeda
commander. Indeed, immediately after bin Laden’s death, there was public
speculation that Anwar al-Awlaki, born in New Mexico but residing in
43
Yemen, might become al Qaeda’s next leader.
The example of al-Awlaki, a dual American-Yemeni citizen, is
especially apt since the ACLU sued the Obama administration to remove
44
him from an official “hit list” of targets. Almost by way of a response to
40. See O’Connell, The Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 14 (“The fighting or hostilities
of an armed conflict occurs within limited zones, referred to as combat zones, theaters of
operation, or similar terms. It is only in such zones that killing enemy combatants or those
taking a direct part in hostilities is permissible.”).
41. AUMF, supra note 10.
42. At ¶55 of his report, Special Rapporteur Alston observes:
With respect to the existence of a non-state group as a “party,” al Qaeda and other
alleged “associated” groups are often only loosely linked, if at all. Sometimes they
appear to be not even groups, but a few individuals who take “inspiration” from al
Qaeda. The idea that, instead, they are part of continuing hostilities that spread to
new territories as new alliances form or are claimed may be superficially appealing
but such “associates” cannot constitute a “party” as required by IHL – although
they can be criminals, if their conduct violates U.S. law or the law of the country
in which they are located.
Alston, supra note 2, ¶55.
43. See, e.g., Chilling Al-Qaeda Email Sent to Undercover Reporter, MAIL ONLINE,
May 5, 2011, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1383804/Osama-BinLaden-dead-Al-Qaeda-email-details-plan-Mumbai-style-terror-attack-UK.html (describing
threats of retaliation by al-Awlaki, “widely tipped to succeed Osama bin Laden,” after death
of bin Laden).
44. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (using standing and
political question doctrines to dismiss suit brought by al-Awlaki’s father and the ACLU).
Events have mooted the issue of removing al-Awlaki from any “hit” list. In late September
2011, the U.S. killed al-Awlaki with a drone strike in Yemen. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt
& Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2011, at A1.
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the ACLU, Robert Chesney, in a recent article, assesses the legality of
45
killing al-Awlaki under international law. Examining IHL’s effect on the
conflict with al Qaeda, Chesney makes several points. First, treaty
language does not clearly impose geographic restrictions. Second, there are
“endless examples of a party to an existing armed conflict using force in the
territory of another state which until then was not experiencing hostilities
within its own borders.” Third, indeterminate case law suggests that
geography should not be decisive. And, finally, a strict, formalistic
approach to IHL’s geographical scope would encourage parties to spread
their forces outside the zone of armed conflict, thus destabilizing previously
46
peaceful states.
Chesney’s reasoning is compelling, since another area of law does limit
where the United States can strike. Consistent with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, a state may resort under limited circumstances to interstate force in
self-defense against a non-state actor (such as a terrorist organization) in a
“host” state. As noted, the level of threat that triggers the right of self47
defense is contested. Self-defense also raises issues concerning consent of
the host state. Some commentators insist that this consent must be express
48
Others see no consent
and public – no winks and nods allowed.
49
requirement at all.
Independent of the consent issue, some take the
relatively narrow view that a violent incursion into a host state is
permissible only if the host cannot control the non-state actor or is
somehow responsible for the latter’s actions. Others take the broader view
that incursions in self-defense are permissible so long as the host is either
50
In practice, these
unable or unwilling to control the non-state actor.
competing abstractions blur into each other, as a state that is unwilling to
control the violent actions of an armed group on its territory might be fairly
51
said to be responsible for those actions.
As long as there are states, the intense conversation about self-defense
is not likely to end. Even so, the law of interstate force, such as it is, makes
common sense. The United States may not carry out drone strikes in, to

45. See generally Chesney, supra note 2.
46. Id. at 33-38.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
48. See, e.g., O’Connell, Case Study, supra note 2, at 24 (“Without express, public
consent of the kind the U.S. received from Afghanistan and Iraq, Pakistan is in a position to
claim the U.S. is acting unlawfully. . . .”).
49. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 2, at 249 (“Nothing in the language of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter or in customary international law reflected therein or in pre-Charter practice . .
. requires consent of the state from which a non-state actor armed attack is emanating and on
whose territory a self-defense action takes place. . . .”).
50. See Chesney, supra note 2, at 21-24 (summarizing these stricter and broader views
on the right to resort to interstate force).
51. Id. at 24.
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give a few examples, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. These
countries exercise thorough control over their territories and are
unequivocally opposed to al Qaeda. Nations other than Afghanistan where
drone strikes have occurred, such as Pakistan and Yemen, fall into a gray
zone where consent and the government’s willingness or ability to control
armed groups is debatable. In this gray zone, one should expect the Obama
administration to apply an expansive construction of its authority to kill
especially dangerous members of al Qaeda. The executive pushes, and
other parts of our constitutional system exist to push back.
C. IHL’s Principle of Distinction Permits Strikes Directed at Members of
al Qaeda and the Taliban Who Function as Combatants
In both international and non-international armed conflicts, attackers
must honor the IHL principle of distinction, which forbids attacks on,
52
among others, peaceful civilians. In an international armed conflict (IAC),
53
a party may attack enemy combatants who are not hors de combat. Thus,
an attacker may bomb opposing forces in their barracks due to their status
as enemy combatants. Civilians, however, may only be directly attacked if
their conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities.
The IAC approach to distinction does not translate neatly to the NIAC
context in part because “[c]urrent conventional IHL governing non54
international armed conflict does not use the notion of ‘combatant.’” As a
result, some authorities contend that all non-state actors in a NIAC must be
regarded as “civilians,” subject to attack only while directly participating in
55
hostilities (DPH). A basic problem with this DPH approach is that it
creates a revolving door that allows a fighter by night to be immune from
56
attack while a baker by day. In response to this problem, states may tend

52. MELZER, supra note 2, at 311-312.
53. Cf. Alston, supra note 2, at ¶58 (“In international armed conflict, combatants may
be targeted at any time and any place (subject to the other requirements of IHL).”).
54. MELZER, supra note 2, at 323; see also Alston, supra note 2, at ¶58 (“Under the
IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict, the rules are less clear. In noninternational armed conflict, there is no such thing as a ‘combatant.’”).
55. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 2, at ¶¶58, 65 (stating that civilians directly
participating in hostilities in a NIAC are subject to direct attack; questioning the correctness
of recent ICRC guidance that allows targeting of persons who are not directly participating
in hostilities so long as they have adopted a “continuous combat function” in an armed
group); cf. Shamsi, supra note 35, at 7 (referring to “civilian” as a “term of art that applies to
alleged terrorists engaging in an armed conflict”).
56. Kretzmer, supra note 2, at 193 (observing that strict construction of “direct
participation” in hostilities would allow terrorists to “enjoy the best of both worlds – they
can remain civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians while
actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act”).
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toward a broad construction of “direct participation,” with the unfortunate
57
effect of diluting civilian protections.
The ICRC has proposed an alternative means to address this problem.
It recently issued an Interpretive Guidance that persons who assume a
“continuous combat function” (CCF) in an organized armed group are not
civilians and may be targeted even while not directly participating in
58
hostilities. Although the ICRC’s approach may ease pressure to adopt an
overly expansive definition of direct participation, it raises interpretive
questions. For instance, at what point does an activity become intense or
frequent enough to be “continuous”?
59
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance lacks broad support. Alston, a
vocal critic, argues that the “the creation of the CCF category . . . is
questionable given specific treaty language” and that the ICRC approach
60
increases the risk of mistaken targeting.
Both the DPH and CCF approaches require application of abstractions
to facts – where both the abstractions and the facts may be contestable and
uncertain. Hina Shamsi, Director of the National Security Project of the
ACLU, observes that “whatever definition [of DPH] the United States is
61
using . . . is more expansive than that of the ICRC.” Inevitably, there will
be gray zones in which security forces will justify attacks and human rights
62
organizations will question them. They have different perspectives on the
same situation. Even so, under either a DPH or a CCF approach, the
Obama administration has reasonable grounds for targeting members of al
Qaeda and the Taliban who are regularly involved with planning,
commanding, or executing hostilities. That much from the law seems clear.
D. The CIA Strikes Have Not Clearly Violated Proportionality
IHL forbids attacks reasonably expected to cause disproportionate
“collateral damage” to civilians and their property. This proportionality

57. See, e.g., PCATI, supra note 2, at ¶¶33, 37, 39 (concluding that civilians lose their
immunity from direct attack by directly participating in hostilities while “preparing” for
hostilities, “planning” hostilities, or participating in a “chain of hostilities”).
58. NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION
OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 27 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-872-p991.htm.
59. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 2, at ¶¶65–67, (“[T]he [ICRC’s] creation of [a] CCF
category. . . is questionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct participation
“for such time” as opposed to “all the time.”).
60. Alston, supra note 2, at ¶¶65-66.
61. Shamsi, supra note 35, at 8.
62. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 2, at ¶68 (criticizing the United States for an unstated
but overly broad approach to DPH under which “drug traffickers on the ‘battlefield’ who
have links to the insurgency may be targeted and killed”).

09__RADSAN__MURPHY_V12_01-09-12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

456

2/9/2012 3:54 PM

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:439

requirement is vital to IHL’s protections of civilians, but it is also
notoriously and necessarily vague. It precludes attacks that should outrage
the conscience of sane people. Again, the United States could not,
consistent with proportionality, have dropped a nuclear bomb to kill bin
Laden in his Pakistani compound. But what about a raid with cruise
missiles? On close cases, one cannot expect different decisionmakers to
apply the vague standard of proportionality in identical ways. There is
room for reasonable differences of opinion.
Some critics claim that the CIA drone strikes have caused civilian
63
casualties at rates of 20:1 to 50:1 to even higher. Notwithstanding the
vagueness of “proportionality,” these ratios on the face of the matter
suggest war crimes. Suggesting a different verdict, the New America
Foundation maintains a comprehensive website that updates available
information on drone strikes in Pakistan. It maintains “that the true nonmilitant fatality rate since 2004 [has been] approximately 20 percent. In
64
2010, it was more like five percent.” This figure accords with off-the65
record comments from a government official. Thus the killer drone, in an
ironic turn of circumstances, might be a very civilian-friendly weapons
platform.
Determining the “true” collateral damage from drone strikes is difficult
due to the remote locations of many strikes, the strong interests of many
observers to distort facts, the veil of governmental secrecy over the
program, and the difficulty of categorizing persons within irregular forces.
The most careful analysis appears to demonstrate drone strikes are
remarkably precise and are becoming more so with time. Low figures on
civilian casualties accord with both the drone’s immense capabilities as
well as the United States’ political, legal, and moral interests.

63. Shah, supra note 34, at 126 (“[T]he intensity and frequency with which these
drone attacks have been carried out . . . have resulted in the unnecessary killing of hundreds
of civilians and needless destruction of infrastructure.”). According to Shah, “the success
percentage of the U.S. Predator strikes thus comes to not more than six per cent.” Id. See
also O’Connell, Case Study, supra note 2 (manuscript at 24) (“Most serious of all, perhaps,
is the disproportionate impact of drone attacks. Fifty civilians killed for one suspected
combatant killed is a textbook example of a violation of the proportionality principle.”).
Others report the ratio of civilians killed for every terrorist as much higher than this. Steve
Breyman & Aneel Salman, Reaping the Whirlwind: Pakistani Counterinsurgency
Campaigns, 2004-2010, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 65, 78 (2010) (claiming that Pakistan
has reported that 140 civilians are killed for every terrorist killed by drone strikes).
64. The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2011,
NEWAMERICA.NET, http://counterterrorism. newamerica.net/drones#2011chart. These figures
draw “only on accounts from reliable media organizations with deep reporting capabilities in
Pakistan,” which include, inter alia, The New York Times, Reuters, the BBC, leading
Pakistani English-language newspapers, and Geo TV, the largest independent Pakistani
television network. Id.
65. Scott Shane, C.I.A. To Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2009, at A1.
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E. IHL Does Not Block the CIA (as Opposed to the Military) from
Conducting Strikes
The CIA has been involved in lethal programs before the reported
drone campaign in Pakistan. It tried to remove Castro through the Bay of
Pigs invasion. When the Bay of Pigs turned to disaster, the CIA plotted to
kill Castro, even reaching out to the Mafia for help. During the Vietnam
War, the CIA was behind Operation Phoenix, a project that captured and
executed thousands of suspected communists. In yet another covert action,
the CIA provided arms and other assistance – mainly through Pakistan as an
intermediary – to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. There, the purpose was
for Afghan insurgents to kill Soviet soldiers. Unlike the prior covert actions
in Cuba and Vietnam, the Afghan project was considered a clear success
when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union later
disintegrated. The eventual rise of bin Laden and al Qaeda based in
Afghanistan, however, caused a reassessment of that success.
Some critics believe that the CIA’s measures to comply with IHL are
inadequate. While American military training manuals discuss principles of
66
humanitarian law at length, the nature of CIA training is not known. For
this reason, Shamsi finds it unsettling that “the laws of war are not part of
67
the ‘DNA’ of the CIA.” Her concerns about the CIA’s willingness or
ability to follow IHL seem misplaced. In counterterrorism, the lines
between military and intelligence functions are blurring. And CIA officials
have learned lessons from the backlash about controversial aspects of the
Bush administration’s “war on terror.” These lessons build on the findings
of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities about abuses in covert actions. The Church
Committee, as that Senate committee came to be known, asserted a political
and legal need for: presidential orders in writing, briefing programs to the
oversight committees in Congress, and opinions from in-house lawyers and
from the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department. The CIA, like
any bureaucracy, is adept at protecting itself. As a result, despite
uncertainty about the CIA’s exact IHL training, it is probable that cautious

66. TARGETING OPERATIONS WITH DRONE TECHNOLOGY: HUMANITARIAN LAW
IMPLICATIONS 31 (Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School), available at http://www.
law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf.
Cf. O’Connell, Case Study, supra note 2, at 26 (“CIA operatives are not trained in the IHL
rules governing the use of force . . . .”).
67. Shamsi, supra note 35, at 10; see also Alston, supra note 2, at ¶73 (observing that
“unlike a State’s armed forces, its intelligence agents do not generally operate within a
framework which places appropriate emphasis upon ensuring compliance with IHL,
rendering violations more likely and causing a higher risk of prosecution both for war crimes
and for violations of the laws of the State in which any killing occurs”).
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CIA officials are trying their best to follow the law, such as it may be, in all
lethal operations.
Nevertheless, some critics insist that the CIA cannot carry out drone
strikes consistent with IHL because the CIA is not a part of the “regular
68
U.S. armed forces.” For these critics, the only way CIA drone operators
“might still qualify as lawful combatants” under the Geneva Conventions is
if they “have a commander, wear insignia, [and] carry their weapons openly
69
and conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”
Yet, O’Connell goes on to say, “operating a drone remotely hardly
70
constitutes carrying weapons openly.”
The charge that the CIA drone program violates the Geneva
Conventions is unpersuasive. Under domestic law, CIA officers are not
members of the U.S. armed forces, but under IHL, intelligence officers may
71
be regarded as such.
CIA drone operators do have a commander
(President Obama) and, if they wished, could wear insignia (perhaps redwhite-and-blue berets) while operating the drones. An official refusal to
confirm or deny the CIA program might suggest that drone operators do not
“carry” their drones openly, but almost everyone concludes that when a
missile strikes someone in Pakistan, the CIA did it.
Assuming CIA officials are civilians, the laws of war do not forbid
72
them from participating in hostilities. Their conduct does, however, carry
consequences under IHL. For one, as civilians directly participating in
73
hostilities, CIA officials could be subject to direct attack from the enemy.
Further, as civilians, they lack “combatant immunity,” which would protect
them from prosecution under domestic laws for killing and destroying in
74
foreign countries.
Thus, in theory, a CIA official who authorizes or
conducts a targeted killing in Pakistan could be vulnerable to murder
charges under domestic Pakistani law. In sum, while IHL does not bar CIA
drone strikes just because the CIA is a civilian agency, it does leave CIA
officials vulnerable to the criminal laws of places where strikes occur.
Non-U.S. domestic law, however, does not bind U.S. officials as they seek
to discharge their obligations under U.S. law.

68. Mary Ellen O’Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror,
35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 327 (2003) [hereinafter To Kill or Capture]; see O’Connell,
Case Study, supra note 2, at 22.
69. O’Connell, To Kill or Capture, supra note 68, at 327.
70. Id.
71. See MELZER, supra note 2, at 317 (2008) (observing that the “notion of ‘armed
forces’” as used in the Additional Protocols “remains functionally wide enough to include
police forces, intelligence agents, and border guards assuming combat function for the
States, without formally qualifying as members of its armed forces under domestic law”).
72. Shamsi, supra note 35, at 9 (observing that “most experts agree that the laws of
war do not prohibit civilians, such as CIA personnel, from participating in hostilities”).
73. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 2, at ¶71.
74. Id.

09__RADSAN__MURPHY_V12_01-09-12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE )

2012]

2/9/2012 3:54 PM

LAW & POLICY FOR CIA TARGETED KILLING

459

III. IMPROVING PROCEDURES THAT LIMIT CIA DRONE STRIKES
Targeted killing by drones or other means necessarily involves an
“intelligence-driven use of force,” a practice that requires identification and
75
justification of targets based on assessments of their functions. Mistaken
identifications must be avoided, and malicious abuses stopped and
punished. These truisms suggest, in turn, that the government should
subject all targeted killings to a thoughtful, detailed process to ensure that
76
only legal targets are identified and struck.
Even assuming IHL or some closely related doctrine of self-defense
applies, existing law offers little concrete guidance for targeted killing by
drone. Special Rapporteur Alston’s strained effort to spell out a process
helps prove our point. In a recent report, he asserts that “[t]he refusal by
States who conduct targeted killings to provide transparency about their
policies violates the international legal framework that limits the unlawful
77
use of lethal force against individuals.” In support of this proposition,
78
Alston cites various texts and cases based on human rights law. In the
next paragraph, Alston switches paradigms and specifically asserts that
79
“[t]ransparency is required by . . . IHL . . . .” In support of this proposition
Alston cites various provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
80
Protocol I. These provisions are only loosely and indirectly connected to
81
Further, Alston lists procedural
the principle of transparency.
requirements for targeted killing by drone. These requirements, as good
policy, include ensuring access to reliable information, requiring “an
appropriate command and control structure,” protecting against “faulty or
unverifiable evidence,” ensuring adequate intelligence on the effects on
82
civilians of an attack, and assessing the proportionality of each attack.

75. Anderson, “Efficiency,” supra note 2.
76. Cf. Alston, supra note 2, at ¶83 (“States must . . . ensure that they have in place the
procedural safeguards necessary to ensure that intelligence on which targeting decisions are
made is accurate and verifiable.”).
77. Alston, supra note 2, at ¶87.
78. Id. at ¶87, n. 149.
79. Id. at ¶88.
80. Id. at ¶88, n. 150 (citing “Geneva Conventions, art. 1; AP I, arts. 11, 85 (grave
breaches), 87(3); Geneva Conventions I-IV, articles 50/51/130/147”).
81. Marching through the cited provisions: GC I-IV, art. 1 provides, “[t]he High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in
all circumstances.” GC I-IV, art. 50/51/130/147 identify grave breaches in substantive
terms. Of the three cited provisions of Additional Protocol I, art.11 bars various practices for
the protection of persons; art. 85 identifies grave breaches; and art. 87(3) identifies the duty
of commanders to “initiate disciplinary or penal action against” subordinates who breach the
Conventions or Protocol. Of these provisions, Article 87(3) of AP I has the closest
connection to transparency.
82. Alston, supra note 2, at ¶89.
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Here Alston cites the HPCR Manual and Commentary on International Law
83
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare.
He seems to agree with its
admonition that those who conduct air or missile attacks should “do []
everything feasible” to verify the lawfulness of targets, to minimize
84
collateral damage, and to ensure proportionality. The HPCR Manual does
not venture beyond Article 57(2)(a) of Additional Protocol I, which
85
imposes the same “feasibility” requirement, or the U.S. Army’s Field
Manual, which demands that “all reasonable steps” be taken to ensure the
86
lawfulness of targets and the proportionality of attacks. The law still
needs to be more specific for drone operators.
We sympathize with Alston’s effort to develop reasonable procedures
from scant sources. In two earlier articles, we attempted something
87
similar. We may cite different authorities from Alston, but we share his
goal in calling for more process and accountability. In one article, we said
that IHL’s demand for precaution “requires the CIA, in general, to adopt
procedures reasonably expected to improve accuracy and to curb abuse
88
without excessive military or humanitarian costs.” While recognizing that
decisionmakers may differ in their application of a “rule of reason,” we
suggested that precaution demands as much independent, public, ex post
89
review of CIA drone strikes as national security reasonably permits. In an
earlier piece, we proposed an aggressive reading of the majority opinion in
90
Boumediene v. Bush, suggesting that the constitutional requirement of due
process even restricts U.S. actions against non-citizens located outside the
91
United States.
The government must take reasonable steps based on
individualized facts to ensure accuracy before depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property. What is required varies with circumstances. Full-blown

83. See id. at ¶89, n. 152-155 (citing the HPCR Manual on International Law
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare and its Commentary, produced by Harvard
University’s Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR)).
84. See HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE, §G.32(a)-(c), Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard
University (2009), available at http://www. ihlresearch.org/ amw/manual/section-gprecautions-in-attacks/g-a-general-rules/rule-32.
85. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, art. 57(2)(a).
86. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10 – THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,
para. 41 (1956).
87. Murphy & Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing, supra note 2 (drawing on
due-process protections of the United States Constitution); Radsan & Murphy, Measure
Twice, supra note 2 (drawing on IHL’s principle of “precaution”).
88. Radsan & Murphy, Measure Twice, supra note 2, at 131.
89. Id.
90. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
91. Murphy & Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing, supra note 2, at 411.
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judicial process is not always necessary. As to CIA drone strikes, due
92
process might be satisfied by independent, intra-executive review.
What is needed is a new, specific understanding of what “due process”
or “precaution” or “reason” – the label does not much matter – demands for
drone strikes. The goal of this new due process should be to balance
national security against the risk of killing persons who are not lawful
targets in an armed conflict or under lawful self-defense. The precise
contours of this new balance have not yet come into focus. Still, since
targeted killing should involve only a few, high-level targets, significant
resources should be available for assessing any given attack. Also, Alston is
correct that the new balance will need to enhance transparency and
accountability. At the same time, this new balance will need to protect
legitimate secret sources and methods.
No one person or group can speak alone to create a new, specific
framework for the CIA’s targeted killing by drone. This framework, if it
emerges at all, will depend on a conversation that includes all reasonable
voices from the human rights, international law, and national security
communities. In particular, the U.S. government, including policymakers
and lawyers, should be a powerful voice in this conversation. The U.S.
government can and should take a leading role in developing and
publicizing standards that maximize accuracy and transparency, consistent
with concerns about national security. The government has already taken a
few steps down this road. Although the CIA will neither confirm nor deny
a drone program, some information has leaked out concerning its
procedures. Agency lawyers prepare detailed cables to justify particular
93
94
targets.
The Agency’s General Counsel signs off on these cables.
(Former Acting General Counsel John Rizzo stated that during his tenure
95
the Agency generally had about thirty targets on the list.) And each strike
96
requires the Director’s approval. Since military and intelligence functions
have become increasingly intertwined, the CIA should learn from the
military’s extensive experience, both practical and legal, in targeting.
If one always expects a judicial trial in, or before, making important
decisions, the procedures we sketch will seem too thin. But depending on
how they are applied, in the context of an armed conflict or in self-defense,
they may be remarkably robust. Whether any given set of procedures

92. Id.
93. See Tara Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2011)
(interviewing former Acting General Counsel of the CIA John Rizzo), available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, a More Aggressive CIA, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 2010, at A1.
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strikes the best balance cannot be determined with mathematical certainty –
in part because such judgments implicate contestable facts and competing
values. It seems obvious, however, that a better balance can emerge only
through a more open conversation than the U.S. government has so far been
willing to indulge.
CONCLUSION
Indulge another scenario, farther from the Oval Office than the scenario
with which this essay began. A group of conspirators has demonstrated its
commitment and ability to kill thousands of peaceful civilians. This group,
though weakened by American counterattacks, remains ideologically and
operationally committed to further attacks. A leader of this group involved
in the planning, command, or execution of terrorist attacks has been
identified in a “host” country, but neither the host nor the United States can,
as a practical matter, arrest him. Should the United States kill this person
97
with a drone-fired missile? Call the target al-Awlaki or al-Zawahiri.
Various critics suggest that the answer is “no.” Some depend on law
that does not effectively bind the United States. A violation of Yemeni law,
for example, presents more of a policy concern than a legal concern, so long
as the alleged American violator remains outside Yemeni reach. On this
score, it is instructive that both the Bush and Obama administrations have
refused to deliver CIA officials to Italian authorities for an alleged
kidnapping of an Egyptian cleric in Milan. Some American intelligence
activities just require a level of illegality.
Other critics depend on contestable applications of uncertain facts to
vague law: the claim that the United States is not in an armed conflict with
al Qaeda, that consent to an incursion must be express, that armed conflicts
are limited to war zones, and so on. This article clears the legal thicket to
show that President Obama and his advisers can adequately address these
critics. Presumably, they have already done so in a classified setting.
The right answer to the question we posed about targeted killing is yes
– subject to qualifications. Under appropriate circumstances, the United
States has legal authority to engage in targeted killing of al Qaeda and
Taliban operatives. (Actually, it has an obligation to do so to protect its
citizens and other potential victims.) This answer is based on a reasonable
application of the substantive law of armed conflict and self-defense and is
consistent with public remarks from the Obama administration. Because
terrorism poses a far greater danger than organized crime or narcotics
trafficking, we must go beyond the law enforcement model for justice.

97. After this essay was submitted for publication, the United States killed al-Awlaki
in Yemen by a CIA drone strike. See Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.Born Militant, supra note 44.
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In the real world, intelligence is sometimes faulty. Mistakes occur, and
peaceful civilians are at risk. The law’s method for preventing the
government from harming people based on mistaken facts is to insist on
reasonable or “due” process. IHL, as an example of one body of law,
demands very little in the way of process beyond the admonition to take
feasible precautions. IHL, after all, must control an infinite number of
variations in combat. Even so, the intelligence-driven nature of targeted
killing, and the accompanying real concerns over mistakes and abuse,
prompt the law – whether couched as IHL or something else – to develop
specifics for the CIA’s drone program. To assist this development, the
United States should publicize and defend its standards for the CIA. If any
of these standards turn out to be indefensible, the United States should
abandon them and develop better rules for its shadow war. Just as the
United States should play a more constructive role in this conversation, so
should some of its critics. Some, it seems, are most interested in using
“lawfare” to block the use of U.S. force around the world. We do not agree
with them. A world in which the United States could not, after taking due
precautions, use deadly force against bin Laden, or al-Awlaki, or alZawahiri would be less secure and less just.

